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³What ISIS Really Wants´ Revisited:  




School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research 





In his influential and provocative article RQ³:KDW,6,65HDOO\:DQWV´SXEOLVKHGLQThe Atlantic 
LQ0DUFK*UDHPH:RRGDUJXHGWKDW³WKH,VODPLFVWDWHLV,VODPLFVery ,VODPLF´+HDOVR
VRXJKWWRFKDOOHQJHZKDWKHGLDJQRVHGDVD³ZHVWHUQELDV´DPRQJacademics and policy makers 
toward religious ideology, whereby religious doctrines or beliefs are relegated to the status of 
HSLSKHQRPHQDUDWKHUWKDQWDNHQVHULRXVO\DVFDXVDOSURSHUWLHVLQWKHLURZQULJKW:RRG¶VDUWLFOH
sparked a wider - and still ongoing - debate over the relationship between Islam and jihadist vio-
lence. For one side in this debate, ISIS is inexplicable without reference to Islamic scripture; in-
deed, some commentators and politicians have even argued that it repUHVHQWV WKH³WUXH´IDFHRI 
,VODPIRUWKHRWKHUVLGH,6,6LVDKLGHRXVGLVWRUWLRQRI,VODP¶V³WUXH´WHDFKLQJVDQGLVLQH[SOi-



























is a response. This article attempts to forge a middle way between these two polarized view-
points by arguing that any comprehensive account of ISIS must recognize both its secular and 
theological bases. More specifically, and drawing on the work of the intellectual historian 
4XHQWLQ6NLQQHULWDUJXHVWKDW:RRG¶Vcritics, in their understandable but misplaced eagerness 
to detach Islam from jihadist violence, fail to accord proper causal weight to the legitimizing role 
of revolutionary Islamic ideas - and the innovating ideologists who develop these ± in the com-































It is just over a year-and-a half since WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI*UDHPH:RRG¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOAtlantic 
cover article ³:KDW ,6,65HDOO\:DQWV´.1 A lot has happened in the interim in Syria and Iraq. 
Palmyra,2 Tikrit3 and Ramadi4 are no longer under ISIS control. After a year of sustained aerial 
bombardment5 by U.S.,6 French7 and Russian8 warplanes, Raqqa, the so-FDOOHG³VWURQJKROG´RI
WKH ,VODPLF 6WDWH LVQ¶W ORRNLQJ VR VWURQJ VWLOO OHVV DQ\WKLQJ UHPRWHO\ OLNH WKH EHDWLILF XWRSia9 
depicted in ISIS propaganda. In recent months, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has reportedly 
killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters,10 LQFOXGLQJ NH\ ILJXUHV DPRQJ ,6,6¶V OHDGHUVKLS PRVW
notably Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, according to the Pentagon.11 In addition to this, the 
JURXS¶V 7ZLWWHU IRRWSULQW12 has decreased markedly,13 and all those earnest think-pieces about 
KRZ WR ³FRXQWHU-PHVVDJH´ ,6,614 QR ORQJHU VHHP VR XUJHQW QRZ WKDW JURXS GRHVQ¶W ORRN VR
prepotent in the offline, real world.15 
 
Yet ISIS, though no longer expanding in Syria and Iraq, is still emphatically here, and in the 
aftermath of the Paris and Brussels attacks, in November 2015 and March 2016 respectively, the 
question of how Islam is related to what the group does and thinks has returned with a 
vengeance, invariably generating more heat than light. There also seems to be a consensus 
emerging, following reports on the secular habits of the Paris and Brussels attackers16 and the 
acquisition of leaked ISIS documents showing the lack of religious knowledge of its foreign 



























about apocalyptic prophesy, the caliphate, hijrah and the sharia? Is ISIS, and the wave of global 
jihadist violence it currently spearheads, really not about religion? 
 
This article directly takes up this debate, but charts a different course by focusing on the 
legitimizing role of ideas in social and political life. If, as Quentin Skinner has convincingly 
argued,18 any course of action will be promoted to the degree that it can be legitimized, it follows 
that ideological principles and WKHLU UKHWRULFDO UHFUDIWLQJ E\ ³innovating ideologists´ (this is 
6NLQQHU¶VH[SUHVVLRQPXVWIHDWXUHLQ the architecture of any comprehensive explanation of the 
course of action in question. This sheds a new light on the debate over the relationship between 
jihadist violence and Islam. Instead of arguing that the former is driven by the latter or insisting 
that the latter has nothing to do with the former, the argument in what follows is that 
revolutionary Islamic doctrines provide legitimizing scripts for jihadist violence. Even if this 
violence, as seems obvious, has deeper social, psychological and political roots, and even if the 
scripts are not sincerely held by those who claim adherence to them, the ideological legitimation 
of jihadist violence is a crucial causal condition of its occurrence. 
 
The article is divided into three main parts. The first part summarizes :RRG¶VDUJXPHQWDQGWKH
criticisms mounted against it. The second part argues that SkinQHU¶Vcore insight that ideals or 
principles are both ³constraining and enabling´ helps clarify existing misconceptions over ISIS 
and its causal connection to Islam. The third part explores the highly charged question of 





























WHAT ISIS REALLY WANTS: RIPOSTE AND COUNTER-RIPOSTE 
 
ISIS is Islamic ± Like, A Lot 
 
In March 2015 The Atlantic published an article by Graeme Wood, a contributing editor at the 
magazine and Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The subject of the article could not 
KDYHEHHQPRUHWRSLFDO³:KDW,6,65HDOO\:DQWV´. In June the previous year, ISIS (the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham), also known as Islamic State, ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
/HYDQWRU³'DHVK´,19 KDGVHL]HG0RVXO,UDT¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWFLW\DQGLQWKHIROORZLQJPRQWKV
captured large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, including, notably, Fallujah, Ramadi and 
Palmyra.20 It had also, by that point, recruited more foreign fighters to its ranks than any other 
jihadist mobilization in recent history 21, eclipsing its chief competitor Al Qaeda DVWKHZRUOG¶V
preeminent jihadist group.22 
 
:RRG¶VDUWLFOHZDVZRUGVORQJDQGLWVWRQHZDVVREHUDQGVFKRODUO\'HVSLWHWKLVLWZHQW
viral. According to the web analytics company Chartbeat,23 it was the best read digital article of 
2015, receiving a total of 100 million minutes of engaged reading time. In the months following 
its online publication it attracted approximately 10,000 views a day. On the night of the 




























The article, in part, served a polemical purpose and was an attempt to refute the view, prevalent 
in Washington political circles in mid-2014, that ISIS was just a bunch of thugs and psychopaths 
who posed no serious strategic threat to the Middle East or the wider world.24 But it was also a 
serious attempt to explain the nature of the group, its origins, aims and broader ideological vi-
sion. ³7KHUHLVDWHPSWDWLRQ´:RRGDUJXHGFLWLQJ3HWHU%HUJHQ¶VFODVVLFVWXG\RI$O4DHGDHo-
ly War, Inc.,25 WRWKLQN³WKDWMLKDGLVWVDUHPRGern secular people, with modern political concerns, 
wearing medieval religious disguise - DQGPDNHLWILWWKH,VODPLF6WDWH´26 This would be a mis-
take, he insisted, for ³PXFKRIZKDWWKHJURXSGRHVORRNVQRQVHQVLFDOHxcept in light of a sincere, 
carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environ-
PHQWDQGXOWLPDWHO\ WREULQJLQJDERXW WKHDSRFDO\SVH´27  ³The reality´KHFRQWLQXHG³is that 
the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic.´28 Of course, he clarified, ³Muslims can reject the Is-
lamic State; nearly all do.´29 But it is absurd to deny its essenWLDOFKDUDFWHUDV³a religious, mille-
QDULDQJURXS´30 
 
Wood also took aim at ZKDWKHGHVFULEHGDV³Dwell-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny 
WKH ,VODPLF 6WDWH¶V PHGLHYDO UHOLJLRXV >DQG VSHFLILFDOO\ ,VODPLF@ QDWXUH´31 ³0DQ\ PDLnstream 
0XVOLPRUJDQL]DWLRQV´KHZURWH³KDYHJRQHVR IDUDV WR VD\ WKH ,VODPLF6WDWH LV LQ IDFW un-
Islamic´32- DYLHZVKDUHGE\3UHVLGHQW2EDPDZKRKDVGHQRXQFHG,6,6DV³QRW,slamLF´33 and 
French President )UDQoRLV+ROODQGHZKRFRQWHPSWXRXVO\UHIHUVWRWKHJURXSDVµ'DHVK¶34 Ac-
FRUGLQJWR:RRGWKLVLVIODWO\³SUHSRVWHURXV´JLYHQKRZFORVHO\DQGDVVLGuously the leaders of 
WKH,VODPLF6WDWHIROORZKRZHYHUVHOHFWLYHO\³WKH3URSKHWLFPHthodoloJ\´RIHDUO\,VODP,WLV



























GRHVQ¶WPDWWHUPXFKLQ:DVKLQJWRQRU%HUOLQVXUHO\ LWPXVWEHHTXDOO\ LUUHOHYDQW LQ5DTTDRU
0RVXO´35 
 
:RRG¶VDUWLFOHSURYRNHG fierce controversy, almost immediately. It is not difficult to see why. 
ISIS has become notorious for its terrible brutality and violence. Since its dramatic rise to 
prominence in the summer of 2014, the group has slaughtered thousands of defenseless Iraqi 
soldiers and Shiite civilians, gunning them into trenches.36 It has raped and enslaved hundreds of 
women.37 It has brutalized children by forcing them to watch scenes of horrific cruelty.38 It has 
presided over public crucifixions in Raqqa.39 It has coerced boys as young as 14 to carry out 
suicide missions.40 It has launched a campaign of murderous aggression against gay men.41 It has 
stolen and destroyed ancient and irreplaceable artifacts.42 And it has created a vast library of 
atrocity porn that degrades not only the helpless victims who appear in it but also those who 
watch it.43 To say that all this inhumanity and carnage is strongly rooted in, or somehow 
connected to, Islam runs counter to the one of the prevailing mantras of polite modern political 
GLVFRXUVHWKDW,VODPLV³DUHOLJLRQRISHDFH´,WVKRXOGEHUHFDOOHGWKDWHYHQ3UHVLGHQW*HRUJH
W. Bush ± widely excoriated across the Muslim world and beyond for launching wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq ± was adamant, as he put it in a speech just after the 9/11 attacks, that 
³,VODPLVSHDFH´³7KHVHDFWVRIYLROHQFHDJDLQVWLQQRFHQWV´KHVDLGRIWKHDWWDFNV³YLRODWHWKH
IXQGDPHQWDO WHQHWV RI WKH ,VODPLF IDLWK $QG LW¶V LPSRUWDQW IRU P\ IHOORZ Americans to 
XQGHUVWDQGWKDW´44) 
 




























7KHFRQWHQWLRQDW WKHKHDUWRI:RRG¶VDUWLFOH WKDW ,6,6LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ ,VODPLFZDVVWURQJO\
challenged by Juan Cole, who accused Wood of engaging in Orientalist ³HVVHQWLDOLVP´ for failing 
to recognize WKDW ,6,6 IDU IURPKDYLQJDQ³,VODPLF HVVHQFH´ LV LQ IDFW D ³destructive Muslim 
FXOW´, radically at odds with the ideals of Islam as understood and practiced by most Muslims. 45 
Cole DUJXHG WKDW WKHUH LV³a center of gravity to any religion such that observers can tell when 
VRPHWKLQJ LV GHYLDQW´ FRQFOXGLQJ ³:K\ SUHWHQG WKDW ZH FDQ¶W MXGJH ZKHQ PRGHUQ 0XVOLP
movements depart so far from the modern mainstream as to be a cult?´46 
 
Mehdi Hasan was similarly emphatic, discounting religion ³as a useful analytical prism through 
ZKLFKWRYLHZWKHULVHRI,6,6´.47 ³,WLVQ¶WWKHPRVWSLRXVRUGHYRXWRI0XVOLPVZKRHPEUDFHWHr-
rorism, or join groups such as ISIS,´ he observed.48 Referring to two British men who purchased 
copies of Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies prior to joining a jihadist group in 
Syria, Hasan asserted: ³Religion plays little, if any, role in the radicalisation process.´49 Indeed: 
³To claim that ISIS is Islamic is egregiously inaccurate and empirically unsustainable, not to 
mention insulting to the 1.6 billion non-violent adherents of Islam across the planet.´50 
 
7KHFRQWURYHUV\VXUURXQGLQJ:RRG¶VDUWLFOHUHIOHFWHGDODUJHUFRQWURYHUV\ILUVWVSDUNHGE\WKH
9/DWWDFNVRYHUWKHQDWXUHRU³IDFHV´ of Islam and, more broadly, the relationship between re-
ligion and violence. Is there something inherently violent about extreme or fundamentalist ver-
sions of religion (let alone Islam), or is the violence carried out in the name of religion at root 



























gious doctrines and beliefs play in terrorism? Is religion a force for good in the world or a source 
of evil? ISIS, because of the vigor and fastidiousness with which it has sought to justify its ac-
tions as divinely mandated, has brought these wider questions to the fore. 
 
+DVDQ¶VYLHZ WKDW UHOLJLRQ± religion here being a euphemism for Islam ± ³SOD\V OLWWOH LIDQ\
UROH LQ WKH UDGLFDOLVDWLRQSURFHVV´KDV JDWKHUHGFRQVLGHUDEOH WUDFWLRQ VLQFH:RRG¶V DUWLFOH ZDV
published last year. Writing after the Brussels attacks in March, The Washington Post¶V ,VKDDQ
Tharoor argued that ³UDGLFDOL]DWLRQLVGULYHQOHVVE\UHOLJLRXVIHUYRUWKDQE\PRUHOocal factors, 
and it is shaped DOVRE\WLHVWRJDQJVDQGRWKHUFULPLQDODFWLYLW\´51 For this view, Tharoor leaned 
RQ5LN&RROVDHW¶V UHFHQW study RI WKH MLKDGLVW VFHQH LQ %HOJLXP DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK³WKH URRW
FDXVHVRIUDGLFDOL]DWLRQ´DUH³KLJKXQHPSOR\PHQWPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQGLVFULPination and a sense of 
DOLHQDWLRQIURPWKHZLGHUVRFLHW\´52 $OWKRXJK7KDURRUUHIHUUHGWRWKH³FRPSOH[LW\´RIWKHFDXs-
es of jihadist radicalization, he declined to identify religion as a salient variable in the causal 
mix. Far more important, he suggested, quoting Cas Mudde, an associate professor at the School 
of Public and International Affairs at the University of GeorJLDLVWKHVWRU\RIKRZ(XURSH³KDV
FUHDWHG WKHFRQGLWLRQV IRU WKHUHVHQWPHQW WKDWGULYHV WKH WHUURULVWV´53 Tharoor also approvingly 
FLWHG³DWRS%HOJLDQSROLFHRIILFLDO´DFFRUGLQJWRZKRPWKHPRVWUHFHQWJHQHUDWLRQRIZHVWHUQ
jihadistVDUH³,VODPL]HGUDGLFDOV´ZKRVHUDGLFDlization is rooted not in Islam but in an essentially 
secular youth revolt against the status quo.54 
 
7KH³WRS%HOJLDQSROLFHRIILFLDO´UHIHUUHGWRE\7KDURRULV$ODLQ*ULJQDUGDVHQLRUPHPEHURI



























versity of Liege. In an August 2015 interview with Paul Cruickshank for the CTC Sentinel Gri-
JQDUGVDLGUHVSRQGLQJWR&UXLFNVKDQN¶VSUREHDERXWWKHSRVVLEOH³HPHUJHQFHRIDQHZEUHHGRI
MLKDGL LQ WKH :HVW´ ³Previously we were mostly dealing with µradical Islamists¶ - individuals 
radicalized toward violence by an extremist interpretation of Islam - EXWQRZZH¶UHLQFUHDVLQJO\
dealing with what are best described as µIslamized radicals¶´ 55 The idea that western recruits to 
ISIS were, as Grignard SXWV LW ³radical before they were religious´56 also finds support in the 
thinking of Olivier Roy. European jihadists, he observes, have Muslim backgrounds, but they are 
not religious, and none has a past of piety. Rather, their route into jihadism is via a broader disaf-
IHFWLRQIURPWKHVRFLHWLHVLQWRZKLFKWKH\ZHUHLQWHJUDWHG-LKDGLVPJLYHVWKHP³Dcause, a label, 
a grand narrative to which they can add the bloody signature of their personal revolt´LQWKHZD\
extremist leftwing ideologies did for some in the 1960s and 1970s.57 
 
LEGITIMATION AND CAUSALITY 
 
In England in the Age of the American Revolution, published in 1930, the British historian Sir 
Lewis Namier warned about public figures who summon high moral principles to explain their 
own actions, and insisted that such professed ideals will be ex post facto rationalizations that 
have little or nothing to do with their actual motives for acting.58 Indeed, for Namier, like the 
Marxist historians he claimed to despise, the ideals invoked by politicians were mere epiphe-
nomena, deployed to conceal intentions of a very different and often inadmissible kind. Namier 



























WHUILHOG IRU H[DPSOH DUJXHG WKDWPDQ\SXEOLF ILJXUHV DUH ³VLQFHUHO\ DWWDFKHG WR WKH LGHDOV´ LQ
whose name they proclaim to act. 59 
 
A similar division, between materialists and idealists, can be seen today in arguments over ISIS, 
where one set of protagonists insists that ideology in the form of radical Islam is the key to un-
GHUVWDQGLQJWKHJURXS¶VYLROHQFHZKHWKHUGLUHFWHGLQVSLUHGor branded, and the other argues that 
materialist factors, like political grievance or political self-interest or social net-works, override 
any ideological-religious dimension. 
 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH1DPLHULWHRUPDWHULDOLVWUHDGLQJRI,6,6WKHJURXS¶VULVHWo power is a story of 
political state failure in Iraq, where jihadists, in collaboration with ex-Baathists from the previ-
ous Saddam Hussein regime, were able to exploit Sunni disaffection and seize territory and re-
sources. Ideology, according to this story, did not drive this historic advance, but rather was, like 
WKH WHUULWRU\ LWVHOIDQQH[HGDQGUHIDVKLRQHGIRU ,6,6¶VRZQSROLWLFDOSXUSRVHV'DOLD0RJDKHG
IRUH[DPSOHDUJXHGFRQWUD*UDHPH:RRGWKDW³DYLROHQWUHDGLQJRIWKH4XUDQLVQRWOHDGLQJWR
poliWLFDOYLROHQFH3ROLWLFDOYLROHQFH LV OHDGLQJ WRDYLROHQW UHDGLQJRI WKH4XUDQ´60 Or as The 
$WODQWLF¶V .DWK\*LOVLQDQSDUDSKUDVHG0RJDKHG³,W¶VQRW,6,6¶VLQWHrpre-tation of Islamic texts 
that drives its brutality²LW¶VWKHJURXS¶VGHVLUHGEUXWDOLW\GULYLQJLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWH[WV´61 
In this view, the will to power, not ideology, iVWKHFDXVHRI,6,6¶VYLROHnce. 
 
On the other side of this argument are those who insist that there is direct relationship be-tween 




























exports of an evil culture that is turning your children away from God, believe that you will be 
rewarded with an eternity of unimaginable delights by dealing death to these infi-dels²and fly-
LQJDSODQHLQWRDEXLOGLQJLVRQO\DPDWWHURIEHLQJDVNHGWRGRLW´62 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former 
0XVOLPZKRLVQRZDPRQJ,VODP¶VPRUHSURPLQHQWFULWLFVVLPLODrly conWHQGHGWKDWWKH³FDXVH




Both sides in this debate make some valid points. But they are also deficient in numerous re-
spects. It is of course entirely plausible that some jihadists are motivated by a sincere religious 
commitment, as they subjectively see it, and that their actions are directly premised on this 
commitment. In fact, there is some empirical evidence to show this.65 But, equally, it is also en-
tirely plausible that others became jihadists not out of a religious commitment and were not re-
motely religious at the time at which they became involved in jihadist activism. There is some 
evidence, also, for this alternative scenario. Coolsaet, for example, in the study cited by Tharoor, 
found that many Belgium jihadists in were not particularly religious or engaged politically. ³Re-
OLJLRQ LV QRW RI WKH HVVHQFH´ KH FRQFOXGHG66 The release, earlier this year, of leaked ISIS re-
cruitment forms would appear to support this view. In a preliminary assessment of the forms, 
:HVW3RLQW¶V&RPEDWLQJ7HUURULVP&HQWHUIRXQGWKDWRI foreign recruits considered 
themselves novices about Shariah law,67 although, as Andrew Lebovich has commented, this 




























VDULO\VD\PXFKDERXWKRZUHOLJLRXVWKH\DUHRUZDQWWREH´68 And of course even disbelieving 
Muslims may possess a deep knowledge of Islam.69 In addition to this, the insistence that belief 
drives action is often based on a naïve reading of what agents publicly say about their actions. As 
6WHSKHQ+ROPHVKDVREVHUYHG³SULYDWHPotivations cannot always be gleaned from public justi-
ILFDWLRQV´70 Or to put it more strongly: people are prone to lie about their motives, either to oth-
ers or to themselves, in an effort to elevate or preserve their moral self-image. 
 
Yet neither does the alternative claim that religion is causally marginal in jihadist violence fully 
stand up to scrutiny. Reza Aslan argues that there is no direct causal relationship between reli-
gion and violence. ³,W LV ULGLFXORXV´KHZULWHV³WRFODLPWKDW WKHDFWLRQVRI ,VODPLFH[WUHPLVWV
DUH HLWKHU QHFHVVDULO\ RU H[FOXVLYHO\ WKH UHVXOW RI WKHLU EHOLHI LQ ,VODP´71 Aslan is right about 
this.72 %XWLVGRHVQ¶WQRWIROORZIURPWKLVWKDWUHOLJLRQGRHVQ¶WIHDWXUHDVa motive, among others, 
in jihadist violence.73 As Peter Bergen recently observed, summarizing his research on jihadist 
activism in the United States since September 11, 2001: ³,IRXQGWKDWWKHSHUSHWUDWRUVZHUHJHn-
erally motivated by a mix of factors, including militant Islamist ideology; dislike of American 
foreign policy in the Muslim world; a need to attach themselves to an ideology or organization 
that gave them a sense of SXUSRVHDQGD ³FRJQLWLYHRSHQLQJ´ WRPLlitant Islam that often was 
precipitated by personal disappointment, like the death of a parHQW´74 
 
More crucially, it also does not follow that even when religious beliefs are not a decisive motive 




























In a series of classic methodological articles on social action,75 Quentin Skinner argued that mor-
al principles are not merely ex post facto rationalizations for actions, serving to give them a ve-
neer of rectitude; they DUHDOVRLQWKHPVHOYHV³HQDEOLQJ´PDNLQJSRVVLEOHDUDQJHRIDctions by 
JLYLQJWKHPOHJLWLPDF\6NLQQHU¶VSRVLWLRQZDVH[SOLFLWO\FRQFHLYHGDVDULSRVWHWRWKHPDWHULDOLVW
tradition in modern thought,76 strongly associated with Marxism, which minimizes or discounts 
the role of ideas in historical change. It also stands in self-conscious opposition to what he de-
VFULEHGDV³WKHPRVWKDUG-KHDGHGRIRXUKLVWRULDQV´OLNH1DPLHUZKR themselves were opposed 
WR0DU[LVP$OWKRXJK6NLQQHUDFNQRZOHGJHG1DPLHU¶VSRLQWWKDWPRUDOSULQFLSOHVDUHUDUHO\LQ
WKHPVHOYHV WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIKXPDQDFWLRQKHUHMHFWHG WKH LQIHUHQFH WKDWSHRSOH¶VSURIHVVHG
principles do not thereby figure causally iQWKHLUEHKDYLRU$VKHSXWLWLQDQRWKHUFRQWH[W³HYHQ
if your professed principles never operate as your motives, but only as rationalizations of your 
behavior, they will nevertheless help to shape and limit what lines of action you can successfully 
purVXH´77 6NLQQHU¶VH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKLVLVWKDWSHRSOHKDYHDVWURQJPRWLYHIRUWU\LQJWROHJLWi-
mize any conduct liable to appear suspect, and to the degree that cannot find a legitimatory war-
rant for their behavior they will be inhibited from pursuing it.78 Furthermore, in claiming that 
their conduct was in fact motivated by some accepted principle they must behave, in Skinner 
ZRUGV³LQVXFKDZD\ WKDW WKHLUDFWLRQV remain compatible with the claim that their professed 
SULQFLSOHVJHQXLQHO\PRWLYDWHGWKHP´79 This shows, he argued, that principles causally matter, 




























Hence, returning to the question of the relationship between jihadist violence and Islam, even if 
it were true that ISIS is animated by exclusively secular political purposes and that its theological 
principles are a mere mask cynically deployed by its leaders to conceal their worldly ambitions, 
WKLVZRXOGQRWVKRZWKDWUHOLJLRXVVFULSWXUHGRHVQRWVKDSHWKHJURXS¶VEHKDYLRUVLQFHZKDWWKH
group is able to do is limited not only by what it can legitimize within the bounds of Islamic 
scripture, but also by what courses of action it can plausibly range within this. 
 
In his seminal 2001 study of religious violence, Terror in the Mind of God, Mark Juergensmeyer 
DUJXHGWKDWUHOLJLRQLV³FUXFLDO´IRUDFWVRIUHOLJLRXVYLROHQFH³VLQFHLWJLYHVPRUDOMXstifications 
for killing and provides images of cosmic war that allow activists to believe that they are waging 
VSLULWXDOVFHQDULRV´80 7KLVDV-XHUJHQVPH\HUFDUHIXOO\DGGHGGRHVQ¶WPHDQ WKDW UHOLJLRXVYLo-
lence is rooted in religious belief, nor does it discount the profound shaping impact of secular 
political imperatives on how and where this violence occurs. But religious ideas are an enabling 
condition of its occurrence - and hence a key part of the causal story of religious violence. 
 
7KLVSRLQW LVEURXJKW LQWR VKDUS IRFXV LQ5XNPLQL&DOOLPDFKL¶VKDXQWLQJ UHSRUWDJH LQ WKH New 
York Times RI,6,6¶VVH[XDOHQVODYHPHQWRI<D]LGLZRPHQDQGJLUOVLQ,UDT³7KH,VODPLF6WDWH¶V
OHDGHUVKLS´ &DOOLPDFKL writes ³KDV UHSHDWHGO\ VRXJKW WR MXVWLI\ WKH SUDFWLFH WR LWV LQWHUQDO
DXGLHQFH´DQGKDVHQVKULQHGDWKHRORJ\WKDWLQWULFDWHO\UHJXODWHVLW81 Sex with a pregnant slave, 
for example, is strictly prohibited, which explains why ISIS forces captive women to take birth 
control.82 Callimachi quotes Cole Bunzel, a scholar of Islamic theology at Princeton University, 



























longer relevant and has fallen into abeyance. ISIS would argue that these institutions need to be 
UHYLYHG EHFDXVH WKDW LV ZKDW WKH 3URSKHW DQG KLV FRPSDQLRQV GLG´83 Rape is endemic in all 
wars,84 DQG WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ UHPRWHO\ ³,VODPLF´ DERXW the practice. But were it not for that 
scripture to which Bunzel refers, ISIS would not be openly acknowledging its embrace of this 
crime, still less bureaucratizing it. 
 
6HHQIURPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYH'DOLD0RJDKHG¶VFODLPWKDW,6,6¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI,VODPLFVFULSWXUH
is driven by its brutality, rather than its brutality being driven by an interpretation of Islamic 
scripture, demonstrates not the causal insignificance of that scripture, but its centrality. For 
Mogahed, as we have seen already, ³DYLROHQW UHDGLQJRI WKH4XUDQ LV QRW OHDGLQJ WRSROLWLFDO
YLROHQFH 3ROLWLFDO YLROHQFH LV OHDGLQJ WR D YLROHQW UHDGLQJ RI WKH 4XUDQ´85 Yet without the 
Quran, and the interpretive possibility of placing a violent reading on it, ISIS would not, contra 
Mogahed, exist nor do what it does in the ways that it does. 
 
.DWK\ *LOVLQDQ GLVFXVVLQJ 0RJDKHG¶V FRPPHQWV LV ULJKW WR VXJJHVW WKDW JLYHQ WHUURULVP
³HPHUJHVDJDLQDQGDJDLQIURPVRFLHWLHVZLWKQR,VODPLFWUDGLWLRQVWRVSHDNRIWKHUH¶VDOLPLWWR
WKH 4XUDQ¶V H[SODQDWRU\ SRZHU ZKHQ LW FRPHV WR SROLWLFDO YLROHQFH´86 %XW LW¶V DQ HVVHQWLDO
reference-point for explaining the political violence of ISIS, since, together with the hadith 
literature (the collected sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), it provides, to use Mark 
-XHUJHQVPH\HU¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ WKH ³PRUHV DQG V\PEROV´ WKDW PDNH SRVVLEOH LWV EORRGVKHG 2I
course these mores and symbols are selectively reinterpreted by the group to suit its own 



























and among Muslims. But to suggest that these mores and symbols do not exist or are not a part, 
however marginal, of the Islamic tradition is some kind of denial, as is, correspondingly, the 
argument that Islam has no causal role in the emergence of ISIS and how it acts. This raises a 
difficult question: Is there something inherent in religion, and specifically Islam, that renders it 
susceptible to demagogic political manipulation? 
 
THE NATURE OF THE WARRANT 
 
In an op-ed article Will McCants, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, took both 
President Obama and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump to task for their views on 
Islam.88 )RU2EDPD³,VODPLVDUHOLJLRQWKDWSUHDFKHVSHDFH´89 ZKHUHDVIRU7UXPS³,VODPKDWHV
XV´90 ³%RWKPHQDUHHTXDOO\ZURQJ´0F&DQWVZURWH³,VODPQHLWKHUKDWHVQRUSUHDFKHV>SHDFH"@
- its followers do. Islam is what people make of it, and they have made it many different 
WKLQJV´91 According to McCants, µ0XVOLPVDEVWDLQDQG0XVOLPVGULQN«0XVOLPVGHIHQGDQG
0XVOLPV GHPROLVK« 0XVOLPV NLOO DQG 0XVOLPV WROHUDWH« 0XVOLPV ZDU DQG 0XVOLPV DOO\¶.92 
$QG VR RQ 0F&DQWV¶V SRLQW LV WKDW ,VODP HQFRPSDVVHV DQ H[WUDRUGLQDULO\ GLYHUVH DQG
contradictory range of actions and practices. There is not one Islam, but a plurality of Islams, and 
ZKDW,VODPPHDQVLVGHWHUPLQHGQRWE\µDQFLHQWLPPXWDEOHVFULSWXUH¶Eut by Muslims and their 
ever-HYROYLQJDSSURDFKHVWRWKHLUIDLWKµ5DWKHUWKDQWDONDERXWZKDW,VODPGRHVDQGZKDW,VODP






This is a salutary corrective to the tendency among politicians and polemicists to speak of Islam 
DVWKRXJKLWFRQWDLQVD³WUXH´HVVHQFHRUIDFHZKHWKHUSDFLILFRUYLROHQWIt also makes good so-
ciological sense, and applies not just to Islam but to all religions. Religion, from this perspective, 
is a moral, cultural and intellectual resource on which people draw and which they use for a vari-
ety of private and public purposes. It provides the guiding scripts and rituals for a whole range of 
social activities.94. But it is equally important to recognize that just as religion enables, it also 
constrains in significant ways, liming the scope of that which is permissible and hence possible.95 
Islam, as the Islamic studies scholar Michael Cook has argued in his 2014 book Ancient Reli-
gions, Modern Politics, is an immensely rich resource. It can warrant a multitude of social ar-
UDQJHPHQWVDQGSUDFWLFHV%XWLWFDQ¶WZDUUDQWMXVWanything. Like all religions, Islam is mallea-
ble, but not indefinitely so. This is Cook: 
 
I have sometimes been tempted to think of a religious heritage as a set of circuits that the 
politically inclined may or may not choose to switch on or as a menu from which they 
may or may not choose to make a selection; that is to say, an ancient religion, like a 
menu, provides its modern adherents with a set of options that do not determine their 
choices but do constrain them.96 
 
,Q D IRRWQRWH WR WKLV&RRNDGGHGE\ZD\RITXDOLILFDWLRQ WKDW³HYHQ WKLVPD\H[DJJHUDWH WKH





























³0XVOLPVDEVWDLQDQG0XVOLPVGULQN´0F&DQWVREVHUYHV98 No doubt this is true (and we all by 
now know just how much Salah Abdeslam99 and the troubled cousin of Abdelhamid Abaaoud 
Hasna Ait Boulahcen100 liked to get their drink on). But, as McCants must know, the consump-
tion of alcohol is not normative in Islam. Nor is swinging, necrophilia or a whole range of other 
sexual perversions, and nor are they ever likely to be. Like any tradition, Islam has limits as to 
what it can warrant. Ideological innovators within the faith try to redefine these limits. Moderate 
Muslims, for example, have sought to question the medieval apostasy laws, according to which 
apostasy is a capital offence.101 Their efforts have centered on reinterpreting Chapter 2: verse 
256 of the Quran ±³7KHUHLVQRFRPSXOVLRQLQUHOLJLRQ´- as a doctrine of religious tolerance,102 
instead of a judgment denying the feasibility of coercion in matters of faith (The entirety of 2: 
UHDGV³7KHUHLVQRFRPSXOVLRQLQUHOLJLRQWUXHJXLdance has become distinct from error, so 
whoever rejects false gods and believes in God has grasped the firmest hand-hold, one that will 
QHYHUEUHDN´103) Although it is a stretch to read it in this way, especially given how condemnato-
ry and threatening the Quran is toward unrepentant disbelievers, a case can be made for it. By 
contrast, it is far more difficult to find in the Quran, still less the hadith (the collected sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad), a warrant for same-sex marriage. But it is not especially difficult to 
find within its pages a doctrine of religious martyrdom, and although, as Bernard Lewis has 
sagely observed,104 it is a dangerous interpretive liberty to extend this to suicide bombing given 
how potently suicide is forbidden in Islam, the case for it is not wholly without foundation and in 
fact enjoys some moral and cultural plausibility among not a few Muslims.105 According to As-
saf Moghadam, AbGXOODK$]]DP2VDPDELQ/DGHQ¶VPHQWRULQ$IJKDQLVWDQZDVWKH³ILUVWWKHo-



























Qaida memEHUV´106 %XWLWZDV$O4DHGD¶VFXUUHQWOHDGHU$\PDQDO-Zawahiri who laid the revo-
lutionary rhetorical groundwork for this highly controversial tactic, as Moghadam explains: 
 
Zawahiri made a claim that many other supporters of suicide attacks would repeat: the su-
icide attacker does not kill himself for personal reasons, but sacrifices himself for God. 
He is therefore not committing suicide, but achieving martyrdom. It was a game of 
words, but it provided justification for hundreds of future suicide bombers to emulate the-
se early shuhada [martyrs].107 
 
Islam does not, as Robert Pape has shown,108 have a monopoly over the use of suicide bombing 
as a tactic, but since 2001109 the vast majority110 of suicide missions have been carried out by 
radical Islamist groups. The reasons for this are complex, and although it is implausible to sug-
gest that Islamic imperatives are centrally driving this, the causal role Islam cannot be discount-
ed. As Diego GambeWWDKDVVXJJHVWHG³a tradition of combative martyrdom, which is stronger in 
Islam than in any other main religion, seems to provide a rationalizing narrative for the perpetra-
tors, their families, and constituencies without which an organization that banks on popular sup-
port could not run SMs >VXLFLGHPLVVLRQV@´111 ³,WFDQDOVR´KHFRQWLnXHG³lift social and norma-
WLYHFRQVWUDLQWVDJDLQVWDEDQGRQLQJRQH¶VIDPLO\DQGZRUOGO\FRPPLWPHQWVE\SURYLGLQJMXVWLIi-
cation for high-cost, higher-order goals´112 Gambetta conFHGHVWKDW³WRDFFHSW60VDVDOHJLWi-
mate means, people need to experience an intense level of political and economic oppression and 
SRVVLEO\IHDUIRUWKHVXUYLYDORIWKHLUJURXS´113 %XWLIWKH\GRH[SHULHQFHWKDW³then a tradition 



























and links it to an array of worldly and heavenly rewards is suited to sustain unpromising conflicts 
because it is more suited to sustain self-sacrifice´114 Hence: ³While the real sources of the con-
flicts in which SMs emerge are ultimately social and political, and secular groups can resort to 
WKHVHDWWDFNVWRRWKRVHRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWFDQEDQNRQWKHµULJKW¶UHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVFDQPRUHHDVi-
ly summon the energy to enter into or to continue fighting against all odds.´ 
 
1RQHRIWKLVLVWRVXJJHVWWKDW,VODPLVWKHURRWFDXVHRIYLROHQWFRQIOLFWVWLOOOHVVWKDWLW³SRisons 
HYHU\WKLQJ´DVWKHODWH&KULVWRSKHU+LWFKHQVSUHSRVWHURXVO\VDLGRIUHOLJLRQLQJHneral,115 but it 
does seem to possess a potential for violence that can be readily mobilized to advance sectional 
interests and objectives. This is assuredly a problem, although it is not clear what can or should 





The whole debate over the religious character of ISIS has become polarized between those who 
insist that it has everything to do with Islam and those who insist that it has little or nothing to do 
with it. In fact, it has become a proxy debate for a much wider debate about the role and nature 
of Islam and its relationship to the secular west. This is why the response to :RRG¶VDUWLFOHgen-
erated so much more heat than light. It is also why so much scholarly discourse on jihadist terror-
ism is morally gamed toward minimizing the role of religious ideology. Scholars, who for the 



























center of gravity away from it. Daveed Gartenstein-5RVV LV ULJKW ³Religion as a topic makes 
most Western scholars extremely uncomfortable: not only do they not understand the Islamic 
faith well, but also dwelling too much on religious ideology surely risks accusations of bigotry. 
So they negate religious ideology as a causal mechaQLVP´116 
 
The ³is ISIS Islamic?´ debate can often seem tortured and polemical. But, as Shadi Hamid has 
argued, it is an important and necessary one, because religion matters in social and political 
life.117 The serious intellectual and political task lies in understanding how it matters and in what 
ways it intersects with the other things, including especially politics and human emotions, which 
also matter. 4XHQWLQ 6NLQQHU¶V PHWKRGRORJLFDO LQVLJKWV KHOp illuminate this fundamental ques-
tion. Religion matters because it is a legitimizing resource of real potency, and, in the hands of 
innovating ideologists, provides moral justificaWLRQV IRU YLROHQFH 7KLV GRHVQ¶W PHDQ WKDW UHOi-
gious ideology is the sole or exclusive cause of violence carried out in the name of religion. But 
it is a key element in any causal explanation of its occurrence, and any account that marginalizes 
or denies this role is unlikely to be particularly helpful in illuminating the conditions that enable 
people to kill for self-proclaimedly religious purposes. 
 
The practical implication that flows from this is that ideas are causally important and that ideas 
which promote violence against innocents must be vigorously repudiated and denied legitimacy. 
They must also be countered by better, more compelling, ideas. One of the most urgent policy 
questions is working out exactly what these ideas are and how to rhetorically frame and dissemi-




























U\´ISIS may be on the back foot militarily, but it is not a propitious moment for engaging in the 
³ZDURIQDUUDWLYHV´118 given that one side in the battle seemingly lacks all conviction, and the 
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